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Abstract
This paper establishes a general equivalence between discrete choice and
rational inattention models. Matejka and McKay (2015, AER) showed that
when information costs are modelled using the Shannon entropy function,
the resulting choice probabilities in the rational inattention model take the
multinomial logit form. By exploiting convex-analytic properties of the dis-
crete choice model, we show that when information costs are modelled using
a class of generalized entropy functions, the choice probabilities in any ratio-
nal inattention model are observationally equivalent to some additive random
utility discrete choice model and vice versa. Thus any additive random utility
model can be given an interpretation in terms of boundedly rational behav-
ior. This includes empirically relevant specifications such as the probit and
nested logit models.
JEL codes: D03, C25, D81, E03
Keywords: Rational Inattention, discrete choice, random utility, convex
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1 Motivation
In many situations where agents must make decisions under uncertainty, informa-
tion acquisition is costly (involving pecuniary, time, or psychic costs); therefore,
agents may rationally choose to remain imperfectly informed about the available
options. This idea underlies the theory of rational inattention, which has become
an important paradigm for modeling boundedly rational behavior in many areas of
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economics (Sims (2003, 2010)). In this paper, our main contribution is to establish
a general equivalence between additive random utility discrete choice and ratio-
nal inattention models. Matejka and McKay (2015) showed that when information
costs are modelled using the Shannon entropy function, the resulting choice prob-
abilities in the rational inattention model take the multinomial logit (MNL) form.
In order for the rational inattention model to generate non-MNL choice proba-
bilities, we need to generalize the information cost function beyond the Shannon
entropy function assumed in much of the existing literature. We do this by exploit-
ing convex-analytic properties of the additive random utility model to demonstrate
a duality between discrete choice and rational inattention models.1
Specifically, we introduce a class of Generalized Entropy Rational Inattention
(GERI) models.2 In GERI models, the information cost functions are constructed
from a class of “generalized entropy” functions; these generalized entropy func-
tions are, essentially, “dual” to the class of random utility discrete choice models;
precisely, the generalized entropy functions are the convex conjugate functions to
the surplus functions in any arbitrary general additive random utility model. Hence,
GERI models naturally yield choice probabilities that can equivalently be gener-
ated from general additive random utility models; the resulting choice probabilities
can take forms far beyond the multinomial logit, including specifications such as
nested logit, multinomial probit, and so on, which are often employed in empirical
work.
Importantly, these generalized entropy functions allow for random utility mod-
els in which the random shocks are dependent across options; this corresponds to
information cost functions that exhibit information spillovers across options with
shared features, which may be reasonable in many decision environments. In con-
trast, the multinomial logit model assumes independent shocks; correspondingly,
the Shannon entropy function precludes information spillovers.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents insights into the fun-
damental convex-analytic structure of the additive random utility discrete choice
model. Using this structure, we formulate a class of generalized entropy functions
and present key results about them. Section 3 introduces the rational inattention
model. We show how the generalized entropy functions can be used to define the
information cost function in the rational inattention model. Then we present the
key result from this paper, which establishes the equivalence between choice prob-
abilities emerging from the discrete choice model, and those emerging from the
rational inattention model based on the generalized entropy functions. Section 4
discusses an example while Section 5 concludes.
Notation: Throughout this paper, for vectors a and b, we use the notation a ·b
to denote the vector scalar product
∑
i aibi. ∆ denotes the unit simplex in R
N .
1Throughout this paper, we will use the terms “additive random utility model” and “discrete
choice model” interchangeably.
2This complements work by He´bert and Woodford (2016), who also consider generalizations of
the information cost function.
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2 Random utility models and generalized entropy func-
tions
Consider a decision-maker (DM) making discrete choices among a set of i =
1, . . . , N options, where, for each option i, the utility is given by
ui = v˜i + ǫi, (1)
where v˜ = (v˜1, . . . , v˜N ) is deterministic and ǫ = (ǫ1, . . . , ǫN ) is a vector of ran-
dom utility shocks. This is the classic additive random utility framework pioneered
by McFadden (1978).
Assumption 1 The random vector ǫ = (ǫ1, . . . , ǫN ) follows a joint distribution
with finite means that is absolutely continuous, independent of v˜, and fully sup-
ported on RN .
An important concept in this paper is the surplus function of the discrete choice
model (so named by McFadden, 1981), defined as
W (v˜) = Eǫ(max
i
[v˜i + ǫi]). (2)
Under Assumption 1,W (v˜) is convex and differentiable3 and the choice prob-
abilities coincide with the derivatives ofW (v˜):
∂W (v˜)
∂v˜i
= qi(v˜) ≡ P (v˜i + ǫi ≥ v˜j + ǫj, ∀j 6= i) for i = 1, . . . , N
or, using vector notation, q(v˜) = ∇W (v˜). This is the Williams-Daly-Zachary
theorem in the discrete choice literature (McFadden, 1978, 1981).
As a running example, we consider the familiar logit model. When the ǫi’s
are distributed i.i.d. across options i according to the type 1 extreme value distri-
bution, then the resulting choice probabilities take the familiar multinomial logit
form: qi(v˜) = e
v˜i/
∑
j e
v˜j . Assumption 1 above leaves the distribution of the ǫ’s
unspecified, thus allowing for choice probabilities beyond the multinomial logit
case. Importantly, it accommodates arbitrary correlation in the ǫi’s across choices,
which is reasonable and realistic in applications.
We define a vector-valued function H(·) = (H1(·), ...,HN (·)) : R
N
+ 7→ R
N
+ as
the gradient of the exponentiated surplus, i.e.
H(ev˜) = ∇v˜
(
eW (v˜)
)
. (3)
From the differentiability ofW and the Williams-Daly-Zachary theorem it fol-
lows that the choice probabilities emerging from any random utility discrete choice
3The convexity ofW (·) follows from the convexity of the max function. Differentiability follows
from the absolute continuity of ǫ.
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model can be expressed in closed-form in terms of the H function as:4
qi(v˜) =
Hi
(
ev˜
)
∑N
j=1Hj (e
v˜)
, for i = 1, . . . , N. (4)
For the multinomial logit case, the surplus function isW (v˜) = log
(∑N
i=1 e
v˜i
)
,
implying that Hi(e
v˜) = ev˜i . Thus, for this case Eq. (4) becomes the multinomial
logit choice formula.
The function H is globally invertible (see Lemma 8 in the Appendix), and we
introduce a function S defined as the inverse ofH,
S(·) = H−1(·). (5)
For reasons that will be apparent below, we refer to S as a generator function.
There is a close relationship between the function S(·) and the surplus function
W (v˜) of the corresponding discrete choice model: as the next proposition estab-
lishes, the surplus function W (·) and the generator function S(·) are related in
terms of convex conjugate duality (Rockafellar, 1970, ch. 12).5
Proposition 1 (Convexity properties and generalized entropy functions) Let as-
sumption 1 hold. Then:
(i) The surplus function W (v˜) is equal to
W (v˜) = log
(
N∑
i=1
Hi(e
v˜)
)
. (6)
(ii) The convex conjugate function for the surplus function W (v˜) is
W ∗(q) =
{
q · logS(q) q ∈ ∆
+∞ otherwise,
where S(·) is a generator function defined in (5). We call the negative convex
conjugate function −W ∗(·) a generalized entropy function.
(iii) The surplus function W (v˜) is the convex conjugate ofW ∗(q), that is
W (v˜) = max
q∈∆
{q · v˜ −W ∗(q)} (7)
4By direct differentiation of (3), and applying the Williams-Daly-Zachary theorem, we have
qi(v˜) = Hi(e
W (v˜))/eW (v˜) for all i. Imposing the summability restriction
∑
i qi(v˜) = 1 we have∑
iHi(e
W (v˜)) = eW (v˜) leading to Eq. (4).
5For a convex function g(x), its convex conjugate function is defined as g∗(y) =
maxx {x · y − g(x)}, which is also convex. Roughly speaking, the gradients (or sub-gradients,
in case of non-differentiability) of g(x) and g∗(y) are inverse mappings to each other.
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and the RHS is optimized at the choice probabilities q(v˜) = ∇W (v˜).
Parts (i) and (ii) establish a specific structure of the surplus function W and its
convex conjugate W ∗; this is new in the literature on random utility models, and
may be of independent interest. We use this structure to define the class of gener-
alized entropy functions. To see how this works, consider again the multinomial
logit model, for whichH is the identity, implying that the corresponding generator
function S(q) = q is also just the identity. Then by Proposition 1(ii), the negative
convex conjugate function is −W ∗(q) = −q · log q = −
∑
i qi log qi, which is
just the Shannon (1948) entropy function.
Generalizing from this, Proposition 1(ii) shows how the conjugate function for
any discrete choice model can be generated by the function S. Therefore we refer to
the negative conjugate function −W ∗(q) = −q · log S(q) = −
∑
i qi logSi(q) for
any general discrete choice model as a generalized entropy function. Comparing
the generalized and Shannon entropies, the former allows for cross-effects, in the
sense that the choice probability for option j, qj , enters the entropic term for option
i, Si(q). As we will see below, these cross-effects allow for information spillovers
when we use these generalized entropy functions to construct rational inattention
models.
Proposition 1(iii) provides an alternative representation of the surplus function
from a random utility model, in addition to Eq. (2). It illustrates a close connection
between −W ∗(q) and the joint distribution of ǫ, the random utility shocks, which
aids interpretation of the generalized entropy function. Specifically, Eq. (2) implies
that the surplus function can be written as
W (v˜) =
N∑
i=1
qi(v˜)(v˜i + E(ǫi|ui ≥ uj , j 6= i)).
Combining this with (7), we obtain an alternative expression for the generalized en-
tropy function, as a choice probability-weighted sum of expectations of the utility
shocks ǫ:6
−W ∗(q) =
∑
i
qiE[ǫi|ui ≥ uj , j 6= i].
In this way, different distributions for the utility shocks ǫ in the random utility
model will imply different generalized entropy functions, and vice versa.
We conclude this section enumerating some properties of the generator func-
tions S(·), which will be important in what follows.
Proposition 2 (Properties of the generator functions) Let assumption 1 hold. Then
the vector valued-function S(·) defined by (5) satisfies the following conditions:
6See Chiong, Galichon, and Shum (2016). Additionally, we conjecture that log Si(q) =
−E[ǫi|ui ≥ uj , j 6= i] for i = 1, . . . , N . For the multinomial logit case, corresponding to
S(q) = q, McFadden (1978) showed that γ − log qi = E[ǫi|ui ≥ uj , j 6= i], for γ being Eu-
ler’s constant.
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(i) S is continuous and homogenous of degree 1.
(ii) q · log S(q) is convex.
(iii) S is differentiable with :
N∑
i=1
qi
∂ log Si(q)
∂qk
= 1, k ∈ {1, . . . , N},
where q is a probability vector with 0 < qi < 1 for all i.
The possibility of zero choice probabilities will play a role in what follows. We
impose an additional regularity assumption on the generator functions S.
Assumption 2 Let q be a probability vector. Then qi = 0 if and only if Si(q) = 0.
This assumption is satisfied for the generator functions S corresponding to
many familiar additive random utility models, including the multinomial logit and
the nested logit models.7
3 Rational inattention
We now introduce the rational inattention model. The decision maker is again
presented with a group ofN options, from which he must choose one. Each option
has an associated payoff v = (v1, ..., vN ), but in contrast to the additive random
utility model, the vector of payoffs is unobserved by the DM. Instead, the DM
considers the payoff vector V to be random, taking values in a set V ⊂ RN ; for
simplicity, we take V to be finite. The DM possesses some prior knowledge about
the available options, given by a probability measure µ(v) = P(V = v).
The DM’s choice is represented as a random action A that is a canonical unit
vector inRN . The payoff resulting from the action isV·A, namely that value of the
entry inV indicated by the actionA. The problem of the rationally inattentive DM
is to choose the conditional distribution P(A|V), balancing the expected payoff
against the cost of information.
Denote an action by i and write pi(v) as shorthand for P (A = i|V = v). De-
note also the vector of choice probabilities conditional on V = v by p(v) =
(p1(v), . . . , pN (v)), and let p(·) = {p(v)}v∈V denote the collection of condi-
tional probabilities. The DM’s strategy is a solution to the following variational
problem:
max
p(·)
(E (V ·A)− information cost) . (8)
7In fact, the necessity part of Assumption 2 arises immediately from the results in this section.
As v˜i → −∞, qi(v˜) → 0, which by (4) implies that Hi
(
ev˜
)
→ 0. Then, since logS(q(v˜)) =
v˜ − log
∑
j Hj(e
v˜), we have log S1(q) → −∞ (by homogeneity of H, we may suppose that
log
∑
j Hj(e
v˜) is a constant).
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The previous literature has used the Shannon entropy to specify the information
cost, which connects the rational inattention model to the multinomial logit model.
We review these results in the next Section 3.1. Then in Section 3.2 we introduce
generalized entropy to the problem. This connects the rational inattention model
to general additive random utility models.
3.1 Shannon entropy and multinomial logit
The key element in the program above is the cost of information. Much of the
previous literature has utilized the mutual (Shannon) information between payoffs
V and the actionsA to measure the information costs. Denote the Shannon entropy
by Ω(q) = −q · log q. Denote also the unconditional choice probabilities by
p0i = Epi(V) and p
0 = (p01, . . . , p
0
N ). Then the mutual (Shannon) information
between V and A may be written as
κ(p (·) , µ) = Ω(E(p(V))) − E(Ω(p(V))) (9)
= −
N∑
i=1
p0i log p
0
i +
∑
v∈V
(
N∑
i=1
pi(v) log pi(v)
)
µ(v). (10)
Accordingly, we can specify the information cost as λκ(p, µ) where λ > 0
is the unit cost of information. As the distribution of payoffs is unspecified, we
may take λ = 1 at no loss of generality. The choice strategy of the rationally
inattentive DM is the distribution of the action A conditional on the payoff V that
maximizes the expected payoff less the cost of information, which is the solution
to the optimization problem
max
p(·)
{∑
v∈V
(
N∑
i=1
vipi(v)
)
µ(v)− κ(p (·) , µ)
}
(11)
subject to
pi(v) ≥ 0 for all i,
N∑
i=1
pi(v) = 1. (12)
Solving this, the DM finds conditional choice probabilities
pi(v) =
p0i e
vi∑N
j=1 p
0
je
vj
for i = 1, . . . , N, (13)
that satisfy p0i = Epi(V). It is an important feature of the rational inattention
model that some p0i may be zero, in which case the corresponding pi (v) are also
zero. Then the rational inattention model implies the formation of a consideration
set, comprising those options that have strictly positive probability of being chosen
(cf. Caplin, Dean, and Leahy (2016)).
Under the convention that log 0 = −∞ and exp (−∞) = 0, we may rewrite
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(13) as
pi(v) =
evi+log p
0
i∑N
j=1 e
vj+log p0j
=
ev˜i∑N
j=1 e
v˜j
,
where v˜i = vi + log p
0
i . This may be recognized as a multinomial logit model
in which the payoff vector v˜ is v shifted by logp0. For options that are not in
the consideration set, the shifted payoff is v˜i = −∞. From the perspective of
the multinomial logit model these options have zero probability of maximizing the
random utility (1) and they have effectively been eliminated from the model.
3.2 The Generalized Entropy Rational Inattention (GERI) model
In this paper we generalize the preceding equivalence result between rational inat-
tention and multinomial logit. To achieve that, we replace the Shannon entropy
by the generalized entropy introduced in Section 2 above. Since each generalized
entropy implies a corresponding discrete choice model (Proposition 2), it turns out
that each RI model with an information cost derived from a generalized entropy
will generate choice probabilities consistent with a corresponding discrete choice
model (Proposition 4 below); this implies that any additive random utility discrete
choice model can be microfounded by a corresponding rational inattention model,
thus generalizing substantially the results in the previous section.
We begin by generalizing the rational inattention framework described above,
using generalized entropy in place of the Shannon entropy. Specifically, we let
S be the entropy generator corresponding to some additive random utility model
satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, and define ΩS (p) = −p · log S (p) as the cor-
responding generalized entropy. We define accordingly a general information cost
by
κS (p (·) ,µ) = ΩS (Ep(V))− EΩS (p(V)) (14)
= −p0 · log S
(
p0
)
+
∑
v∈V
[p (v) · logS (p (v))]µ (v) .
A Generalized Entropy Rational Inattention (GERI) model describes a DM
who chooses the collection of conditional probabilities p (·) = {p(v)}v∈V to max-
imize his expected payoff less the general information cost
max
p(·)
∑
v∈V
(
N∑
i=1
vipi(v)
)
µ(v) − κS(p (·) , µ). (15)
The following proposition characterizes the optimal solution to the GERImodel.
Proposition 3 The solution to the GERI model:
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(i) The unconditional probabilities satisfy the fixed point equation
p0 = E

 H
(
eV+log S(p
0)
)
∑N
j=1Hj
(
eV+log S(p
0)
)

 . (16)
(ii) The conditional probabilities are given in terms of the unconditional probabil-
ities by
pi (v) =
Hi
(
ev+logS(p
0)
)
∑N
j=1Hj
(
ev+logS(p0)
) . (17)
(iii) The optimized value of (15) is
E log
N∑
j=1
Hj
(
eV+log S(p
0)
)
= EW
(
V + log S
(
p0
))
.
Part (i) of the proposition shows that the solution of the GERI model involves
a fixed point problem; in what follows, we assume that a solution exists. Part (iii)
illustrates the close connection between convex analysis and the GERI problem.
To see this, note that the GERI information cost function may be written as
κS(p(·), µ) = −W
∗(p0) + EW ∗(p(V)). (18)
Hence, given p0, the conditional choice probabilities p(v) can be generated, for
each v ∈ V , by the problem
max
p(v)∈∆
{
p(v) · (v + log S(p0))−W ∗(p(v))
}
, (19)
the optimized value of which, by Proposition 1(iii), is
W (v + logS(p0)), for each v ∈ V (20)
corresponding to Proposition 3(iii).
It is worth remarking that some of the optimal unconditional choice probabili-
ties may be zero. For these options, the corresponding conditional choice probabil-
ities will also be zero for all v.8 The rational inattention model then also describes
the formation of consideration sets, i.e. the set of options that are chosen with
positive probability.9
8To see this, consider the solution to the GERI problem given in Eq. (17) and define v˜ = v +
logS(p0). Let p0i = 0. Then by assumption 2 it follows that log Si(p
0) = −∞, or equivalently,
v˜i −→ −∞ and hence pi(v) = 0 for all v ∈ V .
9Because of the possibility of zero choice probabilities for some options, GERI models can also
generate failures of the “regularity” property (adding an option to a choice set cannot increase the
choice probability for any of the original choices). See section B in the Appendix for an example.
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While Proposition 3 does not characterize explicitly the optimal consideration
set emerging from a GERI model, the following corollary describes one important
feature that it has, namely that it excludes options that offer the lowest utility in all
states of the world.
Corollary 4 For some option a, and for all v ∈ V , let va ≤ vi for all i 6= a, and
assume that the inequality is strict with positive probability. Then p0a = 0 (that is,
option a is not in the optimal consideration set).
For the special case of Shannon entropy (when S is the identity function), the
result can be strengthened even further. Corollary 7 in the Appendix shows that in
that case, an option that is dominated by another option in all states of the world
will not be in the optimal consideration set.
3.3 Equivalence between discrete choice and rational inattention
We now establish the central result of this paper, namely the equivalence between
additive random utility discrete choice models and rational inattention models. In
particular, we show that the choice probabilities generated by a GERI model lead
to the same choice probabilities as a corresponding additive random utility model
and vice versa.
Combining the choice probabilities pi(v) in (17) from the GERI model and the
choice probabilities qi(v˜) in (4) from the additive random utility model, we find
that if payoffs are related by
v˜i = vi + log Si(p
0) for i = 1, . . . , N, (21)
then the two models yield the same choice probabilities
pi(v) =
Hi(e
v+log S(p0))∑N
j=1Hj(e
v+logS(p0))
=
Hi(e
v˜)∑N
j=1Hj(e
v˜)
= qi(v˜).
Given a GERI model with payoffs v ∈ V and unconditional choice probabili-
ties p0, we may then use (21) to construct deterministic utility components v˜ for
the additive random utility model. If the GERI model has some zero unconditional
choice probabilities p0i , then Assumption 2 ensures that pi(v) = 0 if and only if
qi(v˜) = 0. The additive random utility model that corresponds to the GERI model
is then an extended additive random utility model in which some deterministic
utility components are minus infinity.
Conversely, given an additive random utility model with flexible generator S
and a prior distribution µ˜ of the deterministic utility components v˜ ∈ V˜ , define
p0 = Eq(v˜) and note that all p0i > 0. Then define v using (21) and define
similarly µ and V using the same location shift log S(p0). By the same argument
as before, the GERI model with payoffs v ∈ V , prior µ and flexible generator S for
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the generalized entropy has the same choice probabilities as the additive random
utility model.
Hence, we have shown the following proposition.
Proposition 5 For every additive random utility discrete choice model and every
prior distribution on V˜ , there is an equivalent GERI model with a prior distribution
on V , where V is equal to V˜ up to a location shift.
Conversely, every GERI model is equivalent to an additive random utility dis-
crete choice model in which the utility components for options chosen with zero
probability are set to minus infinity.
In Section 4, we will apply this proposition to study a GERI model in which
the choice probabilities are equivalent to those from a nested logit discrete choice
model.
3.4 Additional properties of generalized entropy cost functions
We have shown that the generalized rational inattention model is always equiva-
lent to an additive random utility model and conversely that the generalized ra-
tional inattention model may provide a boundedly rational foundation for any ad-
ditive random utility model. The key to this result is the generalization of the
information cost function κS(p (·) , µ) using generalized entropy as defined in Eq.
(14). It is then natural to ask whether κS(p (·) , µ) has the properties that one
would desire for an information cost. In this section we show that κS(p (·) , µ)
does indeed possess two reasonable and desirable properties of cost functions that
have been discussed in the existing literature (cf. de Oliveira, Denti, Mihm, Ozbek
(2015), He´bert and Woodford (2016)), thus providing normative support for the
GERI framework.
First, whenA andV are independent, then the actionA carries no information
about the payoff V. In that case the information cost should be zero, i.e.
Independence. If A and V are independent, then κS(p(·), µ) = 0.
Second, the mutual Shannon information κ(p (·) , µ) is a convex function of p.
This is useful as it ensures a unique solution to the problem of the rationally inat-
tentive DM. We show that the information cost κS(p (·) , µ) has a slightly weaker
property, namely that it is convex on sets where Ep(V) is constant.
Convexity. For a given µ, the information cost function κS(p (·) , µ) is convex on
any set of choice probabilities vectors satisfying {p : V 7→ ∆| Ep(V) = pˆ}.
The mutual Shannon information κ(p (·) , µ) satisfies these two properties. The
next proposition establishes that the information cost defined in (14) using the gen-
eralized entropy functions also satisfies these properties.
Proposition 6 The information cost defined in Eq. (14) satisfies the independence
and convexity conditions.
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4 Example: The nested logit GERI model
From an applied point of view, an important implication of Proposition 5 is that it
allows us to formulate rational inattention models that have complex substitution
patterns, beyond the multinomial logit case. In this example, we consider a GERI
model with an information cost function derived from a nested logit discrete choice
model. The nested logit choice probabilities are consistent with a discrete choice
model in which the utility shocks ǫ are jointly distributed in the class of generalized
extreme value distributions. Among applied researchers, the nested logit model is
often preferred over the multinomial logit model because it allows some products
to be closer substitutes than others, thus avoiding the “red bus/blue bus” criticism.10
We partition the set of options i ∈ {1, . . . , N} into mutually exclusive nests,
and let gi denote the nest containing option i. Let ζgi ∈ (0, 1] be nest-specific
parameters. For a valuation vector v˜, the nested logit choice probabilities are given
by:
qi(v˜) =
ev˜i/ζgi∑
j∈gi
ev˜j/ζgi
·
e
ζgi log
(∑
j∈gi
e
v˜j/ζgi
)
∑
all nests g e
ζg log
(∑
j∈g e
v˜j/ζg
) . (22)
The S function corresponding to a nested logit model is
Si(q) = q
ζgi
i

∑
j∈gi
qj


1−ζgi
(23)
Using this, and applying Proposition 5, the nested logit choice probabilities (22)
are also equivalent to those from a GERI model with valuations
vi = v˜i − ζgi log p
0
i − (1− ζgi) log

∑
j∈gi
p0j

 , i ∈ {1, . . . , n} . (24)
The S function for the nested logit model in Eq. (23) has several interesting fea-
tures, relative to the Shannon entropy. First, Eq. (23) allows us to write the gener-
alized entropy ΩS(p) as
ΩS(p) = −
N∑
i=1
ζgipi log pi −
N∑
i=1
(1− ζgi)pi log

∑
j∈gi
pj

 . (25)
The first term in Eq (25) captures the Shannon entropy within nests, whereas the
second term captures the information between nests. According to this, we may
interpret Eq. (25) as an “augmented” version of Shannon entropy.
Second, when the nesting parameter ζgj = 1, then S is the identity function
10See, for instance, Maddala (1983, Chap. 2), and Anderson, de Palma, Thisse (1992).
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(Sj(p) = pj for all j), corresponding to the Shannon entropy. When ζgj < 1,
then Sj(p) ≥ pj; here, S(p) behaves as a probability weighting function which
tends to overweight options j belonging to larger nests. At the extreme ζgj → 0,
all options within the same nest effectively collapse into one aggregate option and
become perfect substitutes.
From the discrete choice perspective, nested logit choice probabilities allow for
correlation in the utility shocks (ǫ’s) corresponding to the different choice options.
Analogously, in an information cost function constructed from the nested logit S
function in Eq. (23), there will be a common cost component across all options
belonging to the same nest, corresponding to the term (
∑
j∈gj
pj)
1−ζgj which is
common to all Sj(p) for j ∈ gj . From an information processing perspective, this
suggests that there are spillovers in gathering information for options in the same
nest. Information spillovers across choices arise in many decision environments.
For example, a supermarket shopper gains information about common features of
the vegetables, such as the average freshness and quality, while looking at any
of them. In animal foraging, animals who have information about presence of
predators in one grazing site also use that information to update about predator
presence at other nearby sites.
For the Shannon entropy, in contrast, these common terms do not exist, so that
there are no spillovers across options in information processing. From a behav-
ioral point of view, then, more correlated utility shocks makes each option’s signal
harder to distinguish – there is more redundant information – implying that multi-
nomial logit choice probabilities, which would ignore this correlation, manifest a
type of correlation neglect.
To illustrate this point, we compute a GERI model using the nested-logit cost
function. (This requires solving the fixed point equation (16).) In this example,
there are five options, in which the valuations v = (v1, v2, . . . , v5)
′ are drawn i.i.d.
uniformly from the unit interval. We assume that options (1,2,3) are in one nest,
and options (4,5) are in a second nest. With this specification, all five options are a
priori identical, and have equal probability of being the option with the highest val-
uation. Hence, we might expect that any non-uniform choice probabilities should
reflect underlying asymmetries in the information cost function.
In Table 1, we report the average choice probability for each option according
for several specifications of the nested logit cost function. In the top panel, we set
ζ1 = ζ2 = 1, corresponding to the multinomial logit model. In the bottom panel,
we set ζ1 = ζ2 = 0.5.
As we expect, we see that the average choice probabilities are identically equal
to 0.2 across all five options in the multinomial logit case. As we remarked before,
this reflects the feature of the Shannon-based information cost function (Si(p) =
pi) in which information costs are separable across all five choices.
11 Unlike the
multinomial logit case, we see that choice probabilities are higher for the options
11In the nested logit case, we obtained the unconditional distribution by iterating over the fixed
point relation p0 = Ep(V), starting from the multinomial logit distribution.
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Choice probs: Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 Option 5
Multinomial logit: ζ1 = 1, ζ2 = 1
Avg: 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200
Median: 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.194 0.194
Std: 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.060
Overall efficiency: Pr(Choosing the best option) = 0.283
Nested logit: ζ1 = 0.5, ζ2 = 0.5
Avg: 0.221 0.221 0.221 0.169 0.169
Median: 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.157 0.157
Std: 0.116 0.116 0.116 0.081 0.081
Overall efficiency: Pr(Choosing the best option) = 0.355
Table 1: Choice Probabilities in GERI model: Nested Logit vs. Multinomial Logit
1,2 and 3, which constitute the larger nest, and smaller for options 4,5 which con-
stitute the smaller nest. (However, within nest, the choice probabilities are iden-
tical.) The non-uniform choice probabilities for the nested logit model reflect the
cost spillovers across options in the structure of the nested logit information cost
function.
Moreover, the performance of the two models is surprisingly different. Under
the multinomial logit specification, the overall efficiency – defined as the average
probability of choosing the option with the highest valuation – is 28%. The overall
efficiency for the nested logit, however, is higher, being over 35%.
This simple example demonstrates the substantive importance of allowing for
information cost functions beyond the Shannon entropy, which leads to multino-
mial logit choice probabilities. Obviously, it makes a difference for a DM to be
processing information using the nested logit cost function, as compared to the
Shannon cost function, as the highest valuation option is chosen with higher prob-
ability on average using the nested logit cost function.
5 Summary
The central result in this paper is the observational equivalence between a random
utility discrete choice model and a corresponding Generalized Entropy Rational
Inattention (GERI) model. Thus the choice probabilities of any additive random
utility discrete choice model can be viewed as emerging from rationally inattentive
behavior, and vice-versa; we can go back and forth between the two paradigms.12
Then, in order to apply an additive random utility discrete choice model, it is no
12In a similar vein, Webb (2016) demonstrates an equivalence between random utility models and
bounded-accumulation or drift-diffusion models of choice and reaction times used in the neuroeco-
nomics and psychology literature.
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longer necessary to assume that decision makers are completely aware of the val-
uations of all the available options. This is important, as it is clearly unrealistic to
expect that decision makers to be aware of all options in a large set of options.
The underlying idea is that, by exploiting convex analytic properties of the dis-
crete choice model, we show a “duality” between the discrete choice and GERI
models in the sense of convex conjugacy. Precisely, the surplus function of a dis-
crete choice model has a convex conjugate that is a generalized entropy. Succinctly,
then, GERI models are rational inattention problems in which the information cost
functions are built from the convex conjugate functions of some additive random
utility discrete choice model.
A few remarks are in order. First, the equivalence result in this paper is at
the individual level, hence it also holds for additive random utility models with
random parameters, including the mixed logit or random coefficient logit models
which have been popular in applied work.13 Any mixed discrete choice model such
as these is observationally equivalent to a mixed GERI model.
In addition, there is also a connection between the results here and papers in the
decision theory literature. The GERI optimization problem (15) bears resemblance
to the variational preferences that Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006)
propose to represent ambiguity averse preferences, as well as to the revealed per-
turbed utility paradigm proposed by Fudenberg, Iijima, and Strzalecki (2015) to
model stochastic choice behavior. Gul, Natenzon, and Pesendorfer (2014) shows
an equivalence between random utility and an “attribute rule” model of stochas-
tic choice. The main point in this paper is to establish a duality between rational
inattention models and random utility discrete choice models, which results in ob-
servational equivalence of their choice probabilities. A similar duality might arise
between random utility discrete choice models and these other models from deci-
sion theory.
Finally, there are rational inattention models outside the GERI framework; that
is, rational inattention models with information cost functions outside the class of
generalized entropy functions introduced in this paper.14 Obviously, choice prob-
abilities from these non-GERI models would not be equivalent to those which can
be generated from random utility discrete-choice models; it will be interesting to
examine the empirical distinctions that non-GERI choice probabilities would have.
13See, for instance, Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995), McFadden and Train (2000),
Fox, Kim, Ryan, Bajari (2012).
14As an example, the function g(p) = −
∑N
i=1 log(pi) is not a generalized entropy function; thus
a rational inattention model using this as an information cost function would lie outside the GERI
framework.
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A Proofs and additional results
Notation. Vectors are denoted simply as q = (q1, ..., qN ). A univariate function
applied to a vector is understood as coordinate-wise application of the function,
e.g., eq = (eq1 , ..., eqN ). Consequently, if a is a real number then a + q =
(a+ q1, ..., a + qJ). The gradient with respect to a vector v˜ is ∇v˜; e.g., for
v˜ = (v1, ..., vN ), ∇v˜W (v˜) =
(
∂W (v˜)
∂v˜1
, ..., ∂W (v˜)∂v˜N
)
. The Jacobian is denoted J
with, for example,
JlogS (q) =


∂ logS1(q)
∂q1
... ∂ logS1(q)∂qN
... ... ...
∂ logSN (q)
∂q1
... ∂ logSN (q)∂qN

 .
A dot indicates an inner product or products of vectors and matrixes. For a vector
q, we use the shorthand 1 · q =
∑
i qi. The unit simplex in R
N is∆.
Proof of proposition 1. We first evaluate W ∗ (q). If 1 · q 6= 1, then
q · (v˜ + γ)−W (v˜ + γ) = q · v˜ −W (v˜) + (1 · q− 1) γ,
which can be made arbitrarily large by changing γ and hence W ∗ (q) = ∞. Next
consider q with some qj < 0. W (v˜) decreases towards a lower bound as vj →
−∞. Then q · v˜−W (v˜) increases towards +∞ and henceW ∗ is+∞ outside the
unit simplex ∆.
For q ∈ ∆, we solve the maximization problem
W ∗(q) = sup
v˜
{q · v˜ −W (v˜)}. (26)
Note that for any constant k we have W (v˜ + k · 1) = k + W (v˜), so that we
normalize 1 · v˜ = 0. Maximize then the Lagrangian q · v˜−W (v˜)−λ (1 · v˜) with
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first-order conditions 0 = qj −
∂W (v˜)
∂v˜j
− λ, which lead to λ = 0. Then
q = ∇v˜W (v˜)⇔
qeW (v˜) = ∇v˜
(
eW (v˜)
)
= H
(
ev˜
)
⇔
S (q) eW (v˜) = ev˜ ⇔
log S (q) +W (v˜) = v˜⇒
q · log S (q) +W (v˜) = q · v˜.
Inserting this into (26) leads to the desired result.
W is convex and closed and henceW is the convex conjugate ofW ∗ (Rockafellar,
1970, Thm. 12.2). This, along with Fenchel’s equality (Rockafellar, 1970, Thm.
23.5), proves part (iii). Finally, for part (i), let q be a solution to problem (7). Then,
by the homogeneity ofH we have q = 1αH(e
v˜), where α =
∑N
j=1Hj(e
v˜). Then,
by the definition of S it follows that S(q) = e
v˜
α . Replacing the latter expression in
Eq. (7) we get
W (v˜) = qv˜ − q log
(
ev˜/α
)
,
= qv˜ − q
(
log ev˜ + log α
)
,
= log

 N∑
j=1
Hj(e
v˜)

 .
Proof of Proposition 2. Continuity of S follows from continuity of the partial
derivatives of W , which is immediate from the definition. Homogeneity of S is
equivalent to homogeneity ofH. Using the homogeneity property ofW
S−1(λev˜) = ∇v(e
W (v˜+log λ)) = λ∇v(e
W (v˜)) = λS−1(ev˜),
which shows that H and hence S are homogenous of degree 1.
The requirement that
∑N
i=1 qi
∂ logSi(q)
∂qk
= 1 in the relative interior of the unit
simplex ∆ may be expressed in matrix notation as
(q1, . . . , qN ) · JlogS(q) = (1, . . . , 1),
where
JlogS(q) =
{
∂ log Si (q)
∂qj
}N
i,j=1
is the Jacobian of log S(q).
Defining tˆ ≡ log S(q), we have q = H
(
etˆ
)
and hence W
(
etˆ
)
= log(1 ·
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H(etˆ)) = log 1 = 0 by Proposition 1. Noting that (log(S))−1(ˆt) = H(etˆ) the
requirement in part (ii) is equivalent to
(q1, . . . , qN ) = (q1, . . . , qN ) · Jlog S(q) · J(logS)−1 (ˆt) = (1, . . . , 1) · JH(etˆ)(ˆt).
Now, use the Williams-Daly-Zachary theorem to find that
(1, . . . , 1) · J
H(etˆ)(ˆt) = ∇tˆ
(
eW(tˆ)
)
= eW (v˜) (q1, . . . qN ) = (q1, . . . qN ) .
as required.
Part (ii) follows from Proposition 1(ii).
Proof of proposition 3. The Lagrangian for the DM’s problem is
Λ = E (V ·A)−κS(p, µ)+E

γ (V)

1−∑
j
pj (V)



+E

∑
j
ξj (V) pj (V)

 ,
where γ (V) and ξj (V) are Lagrange multipliers corresponding to condition (12).
Before we derive the first-order conditions for pj (v) it is useful to note that we
may regard the terms log S
(
p0
)
and logS (p (v)) in the information cost κS(p, µ)
as constant, since their derivatives cancel out by Proposition 2(iii). Define v˜j =
vj + ξj (v) + log Sj
(
p0
)
and v˜ = (v˜1, ..., v˜N ). Then the first-order condition for
pj (v) is easily found to be
logSj (p (v)) = v˜j − γ (v) . (27)
This fixes p (v) as a function of p0 since then
p (v) = H
(
ev˜
)
exp (−γ (v)) . (28)
If some pj (v) = 0, then wemust have v˜j = −∞, which implies that Sj
(
p0
)
=
0 and the value of ξj (v) is irrelevant. If pj (v) > 0, then ξj (v) = 0. We may then
simplify by setting ξj (v) = 0 for all j,v at no loss of generality, which means that
v˜j = vj + log Sj
(
p0
)
.
Using that probabilities sum to 1 leads to
exp (γ (v)) =
∑
j
Hj
(
ev˜
)
and hence (i) follows. Item (ii) then follows immediately.
Now substitute (17) back into the objective, using pj (v) ξj (v) = 0 , to find
that it reduces to
Λ = Eγ (V) = E log
∑
j
Hj
(
ev˜
)
(29)
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Wemay then use (29) to determine p0. Now apply Eq. (6) to establish part (iii)
of the proposition.
Proof of proposition 4. Assume, towards a contradiction, that p0a > 0. Then
p0a = E

 Ha
({
eVcSc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
∑
b
Hb
(
{eVcSc (p0)}
N
c=1
)

 (30)
< E

 Ha
({
eVaSc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
∑
b
Hb
(
{eVaSc (p0)}
N
c=1
)

 (31)
= E

 eVaHa
({
Sc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
eVa
∑
b
Hb
(
{Sc (p0)}
N
c=1
)

 = E

 p0a∑
b
p0b

 = p0a. (32)
The first inequality (31) follows from cyclic monotonicity, which is a property
of the gradient of convex functions. (See, for instance, Rockafellar (1970, Thm.
23.5).) Since the surplus function W is convex, its gradient, corresponding to the
choice probabilities p(·) is a cyclic monotone mapping, implying that[
p
({
evaSc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
− p
({
evcSc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)]
·
[{
evaSc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
−
{
evcSc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
]
≥ 0.
All the terms within the second pair of brackets on the LHS are ≤ 0, except for the
a-th term, which is equal to zero. In order to satisfy the inequality, then, we must
have
pa
({
evaSc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
≥ pi
({
evcSc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
with the inequality strict with positive probability. Otherwise,
∑
i 6=a
{
pi
({
evaSc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
− pi
({
evcSc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)}
> 0
and[
p
({
evaSc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
− p
({
evcSc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)]
·
[{
evaSc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
−
{
evcSc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
]
=
∑
c 6=a
[
pc
({
evaSc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
− pc
({
evcSc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)]
[eva − evc ]Sc
(
p0
)
≤max
c 6=a
[
(eva − evc)Sc
(
p0
)]∑
c 6=a
[
pc
({
evaSc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)
− pc
({
evcSc
(
p0
)}N
c=1
)]
≤ 0
with the final inequality strict with positive probability. Hence, we conclude that
p0a = 0.
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In the case of the Shannon entropy, Corollary 4 can be strengthened consid-
erably. In that case, any alternative that is dominated by another alternative in all
states of the world will never be chosen, as shown in the following corollary:
Corollary 7 Let S be the identity. Suppose that option a is dominated by option d
in the sense that ∀v ∈ V : va ≤ vd with strict inequality for some v. Then p
0
a = 0.
Proof. Suppose to get a contradiction that p0a > 0. From (13), obtain that for all
options a
1 =
p0a
p0a
=
1
p0a
Epa(V) = E

 exp (Va)∑
b
exp (Vb) p
0
b

 .
Then
E

 exp (Vd)∑
b
exp (Vb) p
0
b

 > 1,
which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 6. Independence: By independence, we have, for all i,
pi(v) = ki, a constant. Then p
0
i = ki and κS(p(·), µ) = 0.
Convexity: Consider two sets of choice probabilities p1 (v) ,p2 (v) ,v ∈ V ,
where both have the same implied unconditional probabilities Ep1(V) = Ep2(V).
For ρ ∈ [0, 1], define pρ as the convexification ρp1 (v) + (1− ρ)p2 (v). Then we
would like to show that
ρκS (p1(·), µ) + (1− ρ)κS (p2(·), µ) ≥ κ (pρ(·), µ) .
But
ρκS (p1(·), µ) + (1− ρ) κS (p2(·)µ)− κ (pρ(·), µ)
=− ρΩS (p1)− (1− ρ)ΩS (p2) + ΩS (ρp1 + (1− ρ)p1) ,
which is positive by concavity of ΩS (p) (Proposition 2(ii)).
Lemma 8 H is invertible.
Proof of Lemma 8. We shall make use of Ruzhansky and Sugimoto’s 2015 invert-
ibility result applied toH. The Jacobian of v˜→ H
(
ev˜
)
is
{
eW (v˜) ∂W (v˜)∂vi
∂W (v˜)
∂vj
}
+{
eW (v˜) ∂
2W (v˜)
∂vi∂vj
}
. The first matrix is positive definite since all choice probabilities
are positive, the second matrix is positive semidefinite due to the convexity of W ,
hence this matrix is everywhere positive definite and then the Jacobian determinant
of v˜ → H
(
ev˜
)
never vanishes. This implies in turn that the Jacobian determinant
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of the composition y → log y → H (y) never vanishes. It remains to show that
infy∈∆ ‖H (y)‖ > 0. But y ∈ ∆ implies that
‖H (y)‖ = eW (logy) ‖∇W (log y)‖
≥ eEmaxj{log yj+εj}J−1/2
≥ emaxj{log yj+Eεj}J−1/2
= max
j
{
yje
Eεj
}
J−1/2
≥
∥∥∥(y1eEε1 , ..., yJeEεN)∥∥∥J−1
≥

 N∑
j=1
e−2Eεj


−1
J−1 > 0,
where we first used that ∇W is on the unit simplex, second that the max oper-
ation is convex, third that the sup-norm bounds the euclidean norm, and fourth
that the minimum of
∥∥(y1eEε1 , ..., yN eEεN )∥∥ on the unit simplex is attained at
yj = e
−2Eεj
(
N∑
k=1
e−2Eεk
)−1
, j = 1, ..., N .
B Example: Consideration sets and failure of regularity
Next, we consider a fully solved out example illustrating the possibility of zero
unconditional choice probabilities and failure of regularity, which can occur in the
rational inattention framework but not in the discrete choice model, and represent
an important point of difference between the two models. Matejka and McKay
(2015, pp. 293ff) have demonstrated that failures of regularity can occur in the RI
model under Shannon entropy. We show that such failures also occur in a GERI
model, in particular for the nested logit information cost function introduced in
Section 4 of the main text.
Consider a setting with four choice options. Table 2 lists the valuation vec-
tors for these four options in the three equiprobable states of the world. We con-
sider both the Shannon and GERI-nested logit models. (For the nested logit spec-
ification, we assume that nest 1 consists of choices (1,2) with nesting parameter
ζ1 = 0.7, and nest 2 consists of choices (3,4) with parameter ζ2 = 0.8.
For each model, we compute the optimal unconditional probabilities (which
as in the previous example, requires solving the fixed-point equation (16)) first for
the choice set {1, 2, 3}, and then for the expanded choice set {1, 2, 3, 4}. This ex-
ample illustrates how adding option 4 to the choice set can results in increases in
the choice probabilities of choices (1,2,3) thus showing a failure of the regularity
property. The optimal unconditional probabilities are shown in Table 3. Qualita-
tively the results are the same between both the Shannon and GERI-nested logit
specifications. With the smaller set of options, we see that only options 1,2 are
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State: v1 v2 v3
Choice 1 2 3 3
Choice 2 1 2 2
Choice 3 3 1 3
Choice 4 2 4 2
Table 2: Valuation vectors in Example 2
Model: Shannon Shannon GERI- GERI-
nested logit nested logit
Choice set: {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 3, 4}
p01 0.71 0.00 0.71 0.00
p02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
p03 0.29 0.51 0.29 0.57
p04 — 0.49 — 0.43
Optimized surplus:
EW (V+ logS(p0)) 2.705 2.865 4.222 6.032
Table 3: Optimal unconditional probabilities for Example 3
chosen with positive probabilities. When option 4 is added, however, then option
1 drops out of the consideration set, and only options 3,4 are chosen with positive
probability. This demonstrates a failure of regularity, as the addition of choice 4
increases the prior choice probability for choice 1. (Moreover, note that with the
expanded choice set, option 2 is chosen with zero probability, even though it is not
inferior in all states of the world, which demonstrates that the characterization of
consideration sets in Corollary 4 is not exhaustive.)
Basically, the addition of choice 4 allows agents to form an effective “hedge”
in conjunction with choice 3. In the state when choice 3 yields a low payoff (state
v2), choice 4 yields a high payoff; on the contrary, when choice 4 yields a lower
payoffs (states v1 and v3), choice 3 yields high payoffs.
23
